Why us involved in libya




















Previously, the conflict involved a broad cross-section of actors who were all minimally engaged and could loosely be broken into two camps: pro-Haftar and anti-Haftar. Today, Turkey, Russia, Egypt, and the UAE have really differentiated themselves from the others, providing significantly more money, military hardware, and diplomatic support. Egypt has threatened to invade—although that appears to be saber rattling. The situation is quite unstable and volatile. This is an incredibly complex situation for the United States and Washington has been rhetorically inconsistent on the conflict.

The State Department has recently called for a political settlement. However, until there is a military stalemate, it seems unlikely that either side will come back to the negotiation table. For the GNA, complete military victory—defined here as control over the oil infrastructure—seems close, perhaps too close to abandon for a compromise. For the LAAF and Haftar, a rout in Sirte or Jufra would probably lead to a collapse of his coalition of fighters; Haftar likely must win to maintain control over his forces.

The United States remains an observer to the conflict and international efforts to come to a political settlement have received no traction. Lost in all this discussion of external actors and escalating military engagements are the Libyan people , who remain the victims here. Their own political leaders have put parochial interests above those of the nation and external actors have exploited historical grievances and opportunistic Libyan factions to advance their narrow self-interests.

In addition, Libya—like so much of the world—is grappling with the pandemic. The Bush administration was eager to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and equally determined to avoid getting bogged down in a prolonged nation-building mission in Iraq. There was little or no preparation for the possible collapse of Iraqi institutions, widespread looting, or an organized insurgency.

The first U. The NATO campaign in Libya was initially aimed at saving civilians in Benghazi threatened by Libyan government forces, but the objective soon expanded to toppling Qaddafi.

The Obama administration was determined to avoid any hint of nation-building in Libya, especially involving sending in American troops.

Tough questions about who would reconstruct Libya or provide jobs for the rebel militia members were left unanswered—or even unasked. Libya disintegrated as rival militias feuded for power, and ISIS seized the opportunity to establish a franchise operation. But these days, it seems, a billion dollars buys you a shit show. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, Washington toppled regimes and then failed to plan for a new government or construct effective local forces—with the net result being over 7, dead U.

We might be able to explain a one-off failure in terms of allies screwing up. But three times in a decade suggests a deeper pattern in the American way of war. In the American mind, there are good wars: campaigns to overthrow a despot, with the model being World War II.

And there are bad wars: nation-building missions to stabilize a foreign country, including peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. For example, the U. The American way of war encourages officials to fixate on removing the bad guys and neglect the post-war stabilization phase.

When I researched my book How We Fight , I found that Americans embraced wars for regime change but hated dealing with the messy consequences going back as far as the Civil War and southern reconstruction. Interestingly, the answer is no. Or consider the Gulf War in , when over 70 percent of the American public wanted to march on Baghdad and topple Saddam Hussein, compared to just 27 percent of the British public.

Most criticisms of the intervention, even with the benefit of hindsight, fall short. This, however, was never the goal. The goal was to protect civilians and prevent a massacre. Critics erroneously compare Libya today to any number of false ideals, but this is not the correct way to evaluate the success or failure of the intervention.

By that standard, the Libya intervention was successful: The country is better off today than it would have been had the international community allowed dictator Muammar Qaddafi to continue his rampage across the country.

Critics further assert that the intervention caused, created, or somehow led to civil war. In fact, the civil war had already started before the intervention began. The very fact that the Libya intervention and its legacy have been either distorted or misunderstood is itself evidence of a warped foreign policy discourse in the U.

As stated in the U. In February , anti-Qaddafi demonstrations spread across the country. The regime responded to the nascent protest movement with lethal force, killing more than people in the first few days, effectively sparking an armed rebellion. The rebels quickly lost momentum, however. Indyk , Kenneth G. Lieberthal , and Michael E. In a quite literal sense, every moment mattered, and the longer we waited, the greater the cost.

It was frightening to watch. Already, on the eve of intervention, the death toll was estimated at somewhere between 1, and 2, The president went with the latter option.

A Human Rights Watch investigation found that at least 72 civilians were killed as a result of the NATO air campaign, definitively contradicting speculative claims of mass casualties from the Qaddafi regime. Zenko may be right, but he asserts rather than explains why mission creep is always a bad thing. It may be that in some circumstances, the scope of a mission should be defined more broadly, rather than narrowly.

Zenko and others never make clear how civilians could have been protected as long as Qaddafi was waging war on them. Rather, we would compare it with what we judge, to the best of our ability, the most likely alternative outcome would have been had the U. There was no end in sight. After early rebel gains, Qaddafi had seized the advantage.

Still, he was not in a position to deal a decisive blow to the opposition.



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